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ExEcutivE summary
•	 The	 ‘turn	 to	 the	 East’	 in	 Russian	 foreign	 policy	 announced	
in	 2010	 has	 failed	 to	 bring	 about	 the	 heralded	 fundamental	
change	in	relations	between	Russia	and	its	Asian	partners,	nor	
has	it	significantly	reinforced	Russia’s	position	in	East	Asia.	It	
has	also	failed	to	create	an	effective	mechanism	for	harness-
ing	the	economic	dynamism	of	the	Asia-Pacific	region	for	the	
purpose	of	modernising	Russia’s	Far	Eastern	territories.
•	 However,	the	‘turn	to	the	East’	has	not	been	merely	rhetorical.	
Moscow	has	genuinely	become	more	active	and	visible	in	the	
regional	multilateral	structures,	and	it	has	been	consistently	
developing	bilateral	relations	with	a	number	of	major	regional	
actors.	One	result	of	this	activity	is	the	diversification	(albeit	
so	 far	 limited)	 of	 Russian	 foreign	 policy,	which	 is	 gradually	
becoming	less	‘West-centric’.	This	diversification	has	allowed	
the	Russian	political	 elite	 to	avoid	a	 feeling	of	 isolation	dur-
ing	 the	 recent	 serious	 crisis	 in	 relations	with	 the	West	over	
Ukraine.	However,	this	diversification	has	been	restricted	to	
the	political	and	diplomatic	dimensions,	and	does	not	extend	
to	the	economic	realm.	The	share	of	Asian	countries	 in	Rus-
sia’s	foreign	trade	and	foreign	direct	investments	has	not	in-
creased	significantly	compared	to	the	still	predominant	share	
of	Western	countries.	It	is	too	early	to	ascertain	whether	the	
limited	sanctions	imposed	by	the	West	in	response	to	Russian	
policy	towards	Ukraine	will	change	this	proportion	in	favour	
of	Asian	countries	at	the	expense	of	the	West.	
•	 Moscow’s	 response	 to	 the	 challenge	 posed	 to	 Russia	 by	 the	
rise	of	Chinese	power	consists	of	three	complementary	com-
ponents:	the	continued	development	and	enhancement	of	co-	
-operation	 with	 China,	 especially	 in	 the	 energy	 sector;	 at-
tempts	 to	 diversify	 economic	 ties	 and	 political	 contacts	
through	intensifying	relations	with	other	Asian	countries;	and	
ostentatiously	 distancing	 itself	 from	Washington’s	 attempts	
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or	intentions	to	adopt	a	policy	of	containment	–	even	soft,	let	
alone	hard	(military)	–	with	regard	to	Beijing.	
•	 Relations	with	Beijing	are	becoming	much	more	important	to	
the	Kremlin	than	co-operation	with	other	Asian	partners.	In-
creasingly,	Moscow’s	contacts	with	other	Asian	countries	are	
being	 subordinated	 to	 its	 relations	with	Beijing.	As	 its	 rela-
tions	with	the	West,	and	especially	the	United	States,	are	de-
teriorating,	relations	with	China	may	soon	become	the	central	
axis	of	Russian	foreign	policy	as	a	whole.	
•	 The	 relations	 the	Kremlin	 is	 building	with	China	 and	 India	
are	expected	to	serve	as	a	model	 for	relations	between	pow-
ers	in	a	new,	polycentric	international	order,	as	postulated	by	
Russian	diplomacy.	This	order,	unlike	the	post-Cold	War	order	
based	on	US	hegemony,	should	(in	Moscow’s	view)	be	based	on	
an	oligarchic	consensus	of	great	powers,	civilisational	plural-
ism,	the	de-ideologisation	of	interstate	relations,	the	absolute	
non-interference	 in	 the	 internal	affairs	of	 ‘great	powers’,	re-
spect	 for	their	spheres	of	 influence,	and	the	prioritisation	of	
business	co-operation.	
•	 The	Kremlin	has	been	successfully	playing	a	subtle	game	with	
Japan	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 convince	 it	 that	 in	 view	 of	 the	 rapid	
growth	of	Chinese	power,	Tokyo	should	be	interested	in	culti-
vating	good	relations	with	Moscow	and	therefore	must	accept	
Russian	conditions	for	settling	the	dispute	over	the	Kuril	Is-
lands,	as	well	as	increase	without	preconditions	its	economic	
engagement	with	Russia.	By	making	efforts	to	intensify	politi-
cal	and	economic	relations	with	Japan,	the	Kremlin	wants	to	
reinforce	its	position	with	regard	to	Beijing,	diversify	its	eco-
nomic	contacts	 in	 the	region,	and	create	more	room	for	ma-
noeuvre	for	Tokyo	in	the	international	arena,	thus	contribut-
ing	to	a	loosening	of	the	Japanese-US	alliance.
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i. thE intEnsification of rElations with 
thE East and its prErEquisitEs 
Since	2010	Russian	officials	and	experts	have	regularly	called	for	
Russian	foreign	policy	to	strengthen	its	‘Eastern	vector’	by	becom-
ing	more	actively	involved	in	political	and	economic	processes	in	
the	Asia-Pacific	region.	A	direct	stimulus	for	this	was	provided	by	
a	special	meeting	held	in	Khabarovsk	on	2	July	2010	by	the	then	
president	of	Russia,	Dmitry	Medvedev.	During	 this	meeting,	he	
set	two	goals:	intensifying	economic	co-operation	with	countries	
from	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region,	 and	 strengthening	Russia’s	 role	 in	
regional	 organisations.	 Medvedev	 ordered	 the	 development	 of	
a	 “comprehensive	 action	 plan	 to	 reinforce	 Russia’s	 position	 in	
the	Asia-Pacific	region”1.	A	few	days	 later,	 the	head	of	the	state-
controlled	Russkiy Mir	 foundation,	Vyacheslav	Nikonov,	present-
ed	a	‘Russian	strategy	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region’	as	developed	by	
a	group	of	diplomats	and	academics	from	the	Moscow	State	Insti-
tute	of	 International	Relations	 (MGIMO),	with	a	suggestion	that	
Russia	 should	 be	 transformed	 into	 a	 ‘European-Pacific’	 state2.	
At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 term	 ‘turn	 to	 the	East’	 (povorot/razvorot)3,	
began	 to	 appear	 in	 Russian	 foreign	 policy	 discourse,	 signalling	
a	radical	change	in	Russian	foreign	policy.	As	one	Russian	expert	
put	it,	Russia	“has	set	itself	the	fundamental	goal	of	balancing	the	
1	 ‘Stenograficheskiy	 otchet	 o	 soveshchanii	 po	 sotsialno-ekonomichesko-
mu	 razvitiyu	 Dalnego	 Vostoka	 i	 sotrudnichestvu	 so	 stranami	 Aziatsko-	
-Tikhookeanskogo	 regiona’,	 pp.	 2,	 10;	 www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/8234.	
The	agenda	was	only	 signed	 in	April	 2011;	 ‘S	vostochnostyu	do	naoborot’,	
Kommersant,	29	November	2011.
2	 ‘Tikhookeanskaya	strategiya	Rossii’,	8	July	2010,	p.	1;	
http://russkiymir2.ru/export/sites/default/russkiymir/ru/events/adver-
tisement/docs/Nikonov_080710.pdf
3	 For	example,	this	term	was	used	by	Vyacheslav	Nikonov	during	the	‘round	
table’	 entitled	 ‘Russia’s	 Foreign	 Policy	 in	 the	 Pacific	 Region’	 held	 by	 the	
PIR-Centre	 on	 6	 December	 2010,	 Index Bezopasnosti No.	 2	 (2011);	 http://
www.pircenter.org/en/articles/102-russias-foreign-policy-in-the-pacific-
region.	See	also	the	report	from	the	Russian	International	Affairs	Council	
‘Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskiye	Orientiry	Rossii	posle	sammita	ATES	vo	Vladi-
vostoke’,	2013,	pp.	5,	7;	http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1523#top,	and	
Viktor	Kuvaldin,	‘Razvorot	na	vostok’,	Izvestia,	29	March	2011.
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European	and	the	Pacific	vectors	in	its	foreign	policy4.”	In	a	2013	
report	 assessing	 the	 results	 of	 this	 policy	 turn,	 the	Russian	 In-
ternational	Affairs	Council	concluded	that	“never	before	has	the	
Russian	Federation	dedicated	so	much	attention	to	its	Far	Eastern	
regions	and	to	issues	of	co-operation	with	Asia-Pacific	countries5.”
The	idea	of	intensifying	relations	with	the	East	is	not	a	complete	
novelty	 in	 Russian	 foreign	 policy	 rhetoric.	 In	 the	 late	 1990s,	 it	
was	forcefully	put	forward	and	promoted	by	Yevgeny	Primakov,	
the	then	minister	of	foreign	affairs.	In	implementing	the	idea	he	
initiated	regular	meetings	of	the	so-called	‘Moscow-Delhi-Beijing	
triangle’.	The	 ‘Concept	for	the	foreign	policy	of	the	Russian	Fed-
eration’	signed	by	Vladimir	Putin	in	June	2000	at	the	onset	of	his	
first	presidency	also	spoke	about	the	necessity	of	paying	greater	
attention	 to	 the	 Asian	 vector	 in	 Russia’s	 foreign	 policy,	 linking	
this	with	 the	 need	 to	 ensure	 economic	 development	 in	Russia’s	
Far	East.	It	also	included	a	proposal	to	raise	the	level	of	economic	
relations	with	China	up	to	the	existing	(implicitly	‘high’)	level	of	
political	partnership	with	this	country6.	In	autumn	2000,	Putin	
himself	wrote	that	“the	time	has	come	to	move,	together	with	the	
states	from	the	Asia-Pacific	region,	from	words	to	action,	and	to	
enhance	(narashchivat)	economic,	political	and	other	bonds”7.
In	 practice,	 Putin	 has	 paid	 the	 greatest	 attention	 to	 China	 and	
continued	the	consistent	development	of	relations	with	Beijing	in	
many	fields	which	had	been	initiated	by	Boris	Yeltsin.	At	the	same	
time,	Moscow	retained	the	close	and	friendly	diplomatic	relations	
as	well	as	military-technical	co-operation	with	Delhi	which	it	had	
4	 Vladimir	Orlov,	the	president	of	PIR-Centre,	‘Russia’s	Foreign	Policy	in	the	
Pacific	Region’, Index Bezopasnosti No.	2 (2011),	p.	90.
5	 ‘Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskiye	Orientiry	Rossii	posle	sammita	ATES	vo	Vladi-
vostoke’,	p.	7.
6	 According	to	this	concept,	Russia	would	develop	‘friendly	relations’	in	Asia,	
“above	all	with	China	and	India”,	Nezavisimaya Gazeta,	11	July	2000.
7	 ‘Rossiya:	Novyie	vostochnyie	perspektivy’,	Nezavisimaya Gazeta,	14	Novem-
ber	2000.
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inherited	 from	 Soviet	 times.	 In	 contrast,	 relations	 with	 Japan,	
which	–	given	its	security	alliance	with	the	United	States	–	was	
viewed	in	Moscow	as	an	integral	part	of	the	West,	remained	cool.	
Any	 fundamental	 improvement	 in	relations	was	blocked	by	 the	
unresolved	dispute	over	the	Kuril	Islands.	(These	islands	were	oc-
cupied	by	 the	Soviet	Union	during	World	War	 II,	 and	 Japan	has	
been	demanding	that	the	islands	be	returned	to	it	ever	since.)	
The	 intensification	 of	 Russian	 discourse	 concerning	 policy	 to-
wards	the	Asia-Pacific	region	seen	since	2010	has	been	accompa-
nied	by	a	major	evolution	in	the	Russian	elite’s	perception	of	the	
balance	of	powers	in	the	international	arena.	The	key	stimulus	for	
this	evolution	was	provided	by	the	economic	crisis	of	2008–2009,	
and	more	precisely	by	the	conclusions	the	Russian	political	elite	
drew	from	it.	They	saw	the	crisis	as	a	manifestation	of	fundamen-
tal	changes	in	the	global	economy,	the	essence	of	which	is	the	ap-
proaching	decline	of	the	global	domination	of	the	West.	According	
to	this	interpretation,	East	Asia	is	gradually	becoming	the	centre	
of	 the	global	economy	by	 increasing	 its	 share	 in	 industrial	pro-
duction,	trade	and	financial	assets,	at	the	expense	of	the	West.	As	
one	 report	prepared	by	prominent	Russian	 experts	put	 it,	 “The	
Asia-Pacific	region	is	increasingly	becoming	the	engine	of	global	
civilisation,	taking	over	the	role	which	Europe	has	been	playing	
over	the	last	five	centuries.”8	
In	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 Russian	 political	 elite,	 the	 economic	 rise	
of	 the	Asia-Pacific	 region	will	 gradually	 be	 converted	 by	Asian	
powers,	especially	by	China,	into	greater	political	influence	and	
military	power.	As	a	result,	within	a	decade,	China	may	become	
sufficiently	strong	to	assume	a	position	as	America’s	geopolitical	
rival	on	equal	terms9.	For	Moscow,	the	US-China	rivalry,	which	is	
8	 ‘Tikhookeanskaya	strategiya	Rossii’,	8	July	2010,	p.	1.
9	 The	 authors	 of	 the	 collective	 report	 developed	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	
Russian	International	Affairs	Council	(which	at	present	is	the	leading	semi-
official	 Russian	 think-tank	 specialising	 in	 international	 relations)	write:	
“It	is	almost	universally	recognised	that	the	Asia-Pacific	region	is	becoming	
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today	still	restricted	to	the	Asia-Pacific	region	but	will	soon	reach	
a	global	scale,	has	already	become	the	main	‘axis’	determining	the	
nature	of	international	relations.	
It	is	commonly	believed	in	Russia	that	the	rise	of	the	new	Asian	
powers	is	inevitably	leading	to	fundamental	changes	in	the	global	
balance	of	powers.	The	Russian	political	 establishment	believes	
that	the	international	system	is	currently	in	a	transitional	phase	
between	the	post-Cold	War	order	based	on	US	(and	more	broadly,	
Western)	hegemony,	and	a	polycentric	order	(the	term	‘multi-polar	
order’	is	frequently	used	in	Russian	expert	and	official	discourse,	
despite	the	logical	absurdity	of	this	phrase:	there	can	only	be	two	
poles),	based	on	a	relative	balance	between	several	great	powers,	
more	or	 less	equal	as	regards	status	and	strength,	each	with	its	
own	 zone	 of	 influence,	 and	 each	 interacting	with	 the	 others	 as	
part	of	a	‘concert	of	powers’.	Moscow	has	emphasised	for	several	
years	now	that	this	kind	of	order	provides	not	only	for	a	plural-
ism	of	political	 and	economic	decision-making	centres,	but	also	
for	a	pluralism	of	value	systems	(civilisations).	
Some	 Russian	 experts	 view	 East	 Asia	 as	 an	 attractive	 political	
model,	providing	an	alternative	to	that	of	the	West.	As	Vyacheslav	
Nikonov10,	a	leading	Russian	expert	in	international	affairs,	has	
said,	Asia	 today	 is	“the	most	 important	global	 testing	ground	of	
the	main	platform	for	global	international	relations	in	the	21st	century.	The	
global	order	and	its	most	important	component,	the	links	between	the	key	
powers,	will	be	defined	by	 the	situation	 in	 the	Asia-Pacific	region,	which	
is	changing	primarily	under	the	influence	of	the	relationship	between	the	
present	global	leader,	the	United	States,	and	the	emerging	global	power,	the	
People’s	Republic	of	China.”	‘Rossiyskiy	Sovet	po	Mezhdunarodnym	Delam,	
Interesy	 Rossii	 v	 Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom	Regione:	 Bezopasnost’	 i	 Raz-
vitiye’,	2012,	p.	18;	a	“sharpening	of	Chinese-US	contradictions	over	a	broad	
spectrum	 of	 issues”	 was	 also	 mentioned	 in	 another	 report	 from	 RSMD,	
‘Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskiye	Orientiry	Rossii	posle	sammita	ATES	vo	Vladi-
vostoke’,	2013,	p.	13.
10	 Nikonov	 is	 currently	a	member	of	 the	 lower	house	of	 the	Russian	parlia-
ment,	and	the	director	(nominated	by	the	President)	of	the	state-controlled	
Russkiy Mir	Foundation.	
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a	model	for	political	modernisation,	which	does	not	involve	West-
ernisation	but	represents	a	unique	path	of	development	based	on	
the	synthesis	of	democratic	forms	of	government	and	local	politi-
cal	culture.”11	It	is	symptomatic	of	the	mood	prevailing	in	Moscow	
that	the	‘Asian	model’	is	presently	also	appealing	to	such	moder-
ate	Westernisers	as	Sergey	Karaganov,	who	regard	Russia	as	an	
integral	 part	 of	 European	 civilisation.	A	 report	 he	 edited	 char-
acterises	the	“Asian	path	of	development”	as	“an	example	of	the	
most	successful	strategy	for	improving	competitiveness	in	global	
economy”	and	emphasises	the	“objective	advantages	of	the	Asian	
state	governance	model	 and	 socio-economic	development.”	This	
positive	picture	of	Asian	models	is	juxtaposed	in	the	report	with	
assertions	 about	 a	 crisis	 of	 “traditional	Western	 economic	 and	
political	 institutions”	and	the	incongruity	of	the	existing	model	
of	“developed	democracy”,	which	is	incapable	of	coping	with	the	
highly	competitive	nature	of	the	contemporary	international	en-
vironment12.
A	distinctive	feature	of	Russian	foreign	policy	is	its	extreme	focus	
on	relations	with	great	powers;	this	is	a	consequence	of	thinking	
in	 terms	 of	Realpolitik,	which	 is	 characteristic	 of	 the	 post-Sovi-
et	political	elite.	For	 this	 reason,	 this	analysis	of	Russian	policy	
concentrates	 on	Moscow’s	 relations	with	 its	 three	 largest	 East-
ern	partners,	China,	India	and	Japan.	This	will	allow	us	to	draw	
a	number	of	conclusions	regarding	the	nature	and	the	results	of	
Russia’s	Eastern	policy	as	a	whole.	
11	 Vyacheslav	Nikonov,	‘Russia’s	Foreign	Policy	in	the	Pacific	Region’,	Index Be-
zopasnosti	No.	2	(97)	(2011),	p.	90.
12	 Sergey	Karaganov,	Oleg	Barabanov,	Timofey	Bordachev,	K Velikomu Okeanu, 
ili novaya globalizatsiya Rossii,	Moscow,	July	2012,	pp.	12	and	16.
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ii. thE policy of EngagEmEnt – thE russian 
rEaction to thE risE of china’s powEr 
Over	 the	past	 few	years,	 relations	between	Moscow	and	Beijing	
have	acquired	a	special,	privileged	nature.	The	Russian	president	
has	been	meeting	with	Chinese	leaders	more	frequently	than	with	
leaders	of	any	other	country	(with	the	exception	of	CIS	countries)	
as	 frequently	as	he	does	with	 leaders	of	 the	People’s	Republic	of	
China.	 In	2013,	 the	Chinese	and	Russian	 leaders	met	on	five	oc-
casions,	as	 they	will	 in	201413.	The	network	of	contacts	between	
high-ranking	officials	and	politicians	from	these	two	countries	is	
similarly	dense.	Over	thirty	meetings	at	the	levels	of	prime	min-
isters,	ministers,	parliamentary	speakers	and	senior	military	of-
ficials	were	held	in	201314.	Since	2003,	the	armed	forces	of	the	two	
countries	have	held	joint	exercises	almost	annually	(these	exer-
cises	have	been	either	bilateral	or	as	part	of	the	Shanghai	Co-op-
eration	Organisation)15.	These	ever	closer	diplomatic	and	military	
contacts	have	been	accompanied	by	the	intensification	of	econom-
ic	relations.	Symptomatically,	since	2010	China	has	been	Russia’s	
largest	trade	partner,	outpacing	Germany.	
The	Kremlin	clearly	views	its	relations	with	Beijing	as	incompa-
rably	more	significant	than	contacts	with	any	other	Asian	part-
ner.	Moscow	is	increasingly	instrumentalising	its	relations	with	
the	other	Asian	countries	in	order	to	enhance	its	position	in	deal-
ing	with	Beijing.	One	could	even	risk	the	thesis	that	relations	with	
China	are	gradually	becoming	the	main	pivot	in	Russian	foreign	
policy	in	general.	
13	 An	 interview	with	 the	 ambassador	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 to	 Beijing,	
Andrey	Denisov;	http://www.rg.ru/2014/03/31/obmen.html	
14	 Calculated	on	the	basis	of	data	compiled	by	Yu	Bin	in	Comparative Connec-
tions. A Triannual E-Journal on East Asia Bilateral Relations,	vol.	15,	no.	1,	pp.	
146–147;	vol.	15,	no.	2,	pp.	142–144,	vol.	15,	no.	3,	pp.	133-135.
15	 The	exercises	were	not	held	in	2006,	2008	and	2011;	however	they	were	held	
twice	in	2009,	2012	and	2013.	For	details	see	Yu	Bin,	‘Summer	Heat	and	Sino-
-Russian	 Strategizing’	 in:	 Comparative Connections. A Triannual E-Journal 
on	East Asia Bilateral Relations,	volume	15,	no.	2,	p.	141.
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Russian	elites	are	impressed	by	the	rapid	growth	of	China’s	eco-
nomic,	 political	 and	military	 power	 seen	 over	 the	 past	 decade.	
They	are	also	aware	of	the	reversal	in	the	power	ratio	between	the	
two	countries.	Bearing	this	 in	mind,	the	Kremlin	has	apparent-
ly	come	to	the	conclusion	that	avoiding	open	confrontation	with	
China	should	be	an	absolute	imperative	in	Russian	policy.	For	this	
reason,	it	formulated	an	official	slogan	that	the	policy	of	partner-
ship	and	building	closer	bonds	with	China	has	“no	alternative.”	
Moscow	 officially	 stresses	 that	 presently	 its	 bilateral	 relations	
with	Beijing	are	exemplary,	and	denies	 that	 increasing	Chinese	
power	could	pose	any	direct	threat	to	Russia.	Vladimir	Putin	has	
on	several	occasions	emphasised	in	public	that	growing	Chinese	
power	does	not	constitute	a	 threat	 to	Russia.	 In	November	2011,	
while	 answering	 a	 question	 concerning	 the	 Chinese	 threat,	 he	
explained	that	although	the	natural	resources	in	Siberia	and	the	
Far	East	could	be	very	attractive,	the	“main	struggle	is	for	global	
leadership,	and	we	do	not	 intend	to	go	into	disputes	with	China	
over	 this.	China	has	other	competitors	 in	 this	area.	So	 let	 them	
contend	with	one	 another.”16	 In	 other	words,	he	was	 suggesting	
that	China	did	not	pose	a	threat	to	Russia	because	it	was	engaged	
in	rivalry	with	the	United	States.	Putin	reiterated	this	diagnosis	
a	few	months	later,	arguing	that	“China’s	behaviour	on	the	global	
arena	has	given	no	cause	to	speak	about	its	aspirations	to	domi-
nance”	and	added	that	the	growing	Chinese	economy	did	not	pose	
a	 threat,	but	 instead	created	 the	opportunity	 “to	fill	 our	econo-
my’s	sails	with	the	Chinese	wind.”17	Before	the	Shanghai	summit	
in	May	2014,	the	Russian	president	described	relations	with	Chi-
na	as	“exemplary	co-operation	which	should	serve	as	a	model	to	
great	global	powers.”18
16	 An	interview	for	the	Russian	media,	17	November	2011;	http://archive.pre-
mier.gov.ru/events/pressconferences/16755/
17	 ‘Rossiya	i	menyayushchiysia	mir’,	Moskovskie Novosti,	27	February	2012.
18	 An	interview	for	the	Chinese	media,	19	May	2014;	http://news.kremlin.ru/
transcripts/21031.
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Experts	close	to	the	Kremlin	back	the	thesis	that	China	poses	no	
direct	threat	to	Russia.	Vyacheslav	Nikonov	even	claims	that	“di-
rect	diktat	and	dominance	are	not	part	of	the	Chinese	tradition.”19	
Similarly,	 in	a	report	prepared	for	the	Valdai	Club,	the	group	of	
authors	 led	by	Sergey	Karaganov	maintain	that	China	will	pose	
no	military,	political	or	demographic	threat	to	Russia	in	the	short	
or	medium	term20.	
While	downplaying	or	even	negating	the	existence	of	the	threats	
posed	by	China,	the	Russian	leaders	seem	to	be	applying	a	strat-
egy	towards	Beijing	based	on	three	elements:	
(1)	 developing	 economic	 co-operation	 with	 China,	 especially	 in	
the	energy	sector;
(2)	 searching	 for	 a	 diversification	 of	 economic	 and	political	 ties	
with	 China	 by	 developing	 contacts	 with	 other	 Asian	 countries	
(India,	Japan,	Vietnam	and	South	Korea);	
(3)	ostentatiously	distancing	itself	from	Washington’s	attempts	or	
intentions	to	conduct	a	policy	of	soft,	let	alone	hard	(military)	con-
tainment	with	regard	to	Beijing,	while	at	the	same	time	promot-
ing	a	regional	security	concept	which	boils	down	to	removing	the	
US	military	presence	from	the	region.	
It	has	become	almost	a	ritual	for	the	leaders	of	the	two	countries	
to	 emphasise	 that	 economic	 co-operation	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	
Russian-Chinese	relations.	As	mentioned	already,	China	has	been	
Russia’s	largest	trade	partner	since	2010.	Bilateral	trade	has	been	
growing	 rapidly	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 (43%	 in	 2010,	 42.7%	 in	
2011,	11.2%	in	2012	and	1.7%	in	2013)	to	reach	a	volume	of	US$88.8	
19	 ‘Tikhookeanskaya	strategiya	Rossii’,	8	July	2010,	p.	6.
20	 Sergey	Karaganov	(ed.),	K Velikomu okeanu–2, ili rossiyskiy ryvok k Azii,	Mos-
cow,	February	2014,	p.	25.
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
1/
20
14
15
billion	in	201321.	However,	these	trade	relations	are	asymmetrical	
in	a	way	which	is	unfavourable	to	Russia.	China’s	share	in	Russian	
trade	is	10.5%,	while	Russia’s	share	in	China’s	trade	only	slightly	
exceeds	2%.	At	the	same	time,	despite	Russia’s	frequently	reiter-
ated	declarations,	Russia	has	been	unable	to	change	the	structure	
of	 bilateral	 trade	 where	 it	 predominantly	 supplies	 oil	 and	 gas	
(in	2012,	they	accounted	for	70%	of	the	value	of	Russian	exports,	
while	machines	and	equipment	only	0.7%)22,	and	imports	indus-
trial	goods,	including,	increasingly,	machines	and	equipment.	
Energy	co-operation	has	beyond	any	doubt	become	the	strategic	
core	of	Russian-Chinese	economic	relations.	The	most	important	
element	of	this	co-operation	is	the	long-term	contracts	signed	by	
Russia’s	 state-controlled	 company	 Rosneft,	 which	 envisage	 oil	
supplies	with	prepayments	(see	Table	1).
Table 1.	Rosneft’s	contracts	for	supplying	oil	to	China
Year Partner timeframe
oil	quantity	
(millions	of	
tonnes)
estimated	
contract	value	
(US$	billions)
prepayment	
value		
(US$	billions)
2009 CNPC 2011-2030 180 65 15
2013 CNPC 2013-2038 360 270 60
2013* SINOPEC 2013-2023 100 85 20
*A	framework	agreement
As	 regards	 the	 gas	 sector,	 in	 contrast,	 larger-scale	 Chinese-
-Russian	 co-operation	 had	 until	 recently	 remained	 at	 the	 plan-
ning	 level.	 Russia	 would	 sporadically	 export	 relatively	 small	
21	 http://en.ria.ru/business/20130110/178687770/China-Russia_Trade_Up_11_
to_88_Bln_in.html;	10	January	2013.
22	 Yevgeny	Novozhilov,	Vneshniaya torgovla Rossii i Kitaya: polgoda i tri kvartala,	
17	October	2013.
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amounts	 of	 liquefied	natural	 gas	 to	China	under	 spot	 contracts	
(e.g.	around	500	million	m3	in	2012).	The	long-term,	30-year	con-
tract	signed	by	Gazprom	and	CNPC	on	21	May	2014	in	Shanghai,	
which	provides	 for	 supply	of	up	 to	38	bcm	of	natural	gas	annu-
ally	from	the	Kovykta	and	Chayanda	gas	fields	in	Eastern	Siberia,	
marked	a	real	breakthrough.	The	contract’s	total	value	stands	at	
US$400	billion,	and	envisages	a	 total	 supply	of	 1032	bcm	of	gas.	
Deliveries	are	planned	to	start	in	2018,	but	each	of	the	parties	has	
the	 right	 to	postpone	 the	 start	 of	deliveries	by	 two	years23.	The	
contract	provides	for	the	option	of	prepayment	at	US$25	billion24.	
One	day	before	 this	 contract,	Russia’s	Novatek signed	a	 20-year	
contract	to	supply	3	million	tonnes	of	liquefied	natural	gas	(start-
ing	in	2017).	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	Chinese	partner,	China	De-
velopment	Bank	Corporation,	is	expected	to	play	the	main	role	in	
financing	the	project,	and	is	ready	to	invest	US$20	billion25.	In	his	
address	at	the	Saint	Petersburg	International	Economic	Forum	on	
23	May	2014,	President	Putin	suggested	that	China	had	agreed	to	
start	talks	on	the	possibility	of	supplying	Russian	gas	from	West-
ern	Siberian	fields	“via	the	western	route”)26.
The	fact	that	Gazprom	and	CNPC	finally	struck	the	deal	after	ten	
years	of	negotiations,	which	were	still	ongoing	 the	night	before	
the	date	of	 its	signing,	was	undoubtedly	due	to	political	 factors,	
namely	 Russia’s	 ongoing	 conflict	 with	 the	 West	 over	 Ukraine,	
and	 especially	 the	 associated	Western	 sanctions	 and	 the	 threat	
that	 they	could	be	extended	further,	as	well	as	 the	 intensifying	
23	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/26938871/kontrakt
24	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/26876561/gazprom-i-kitaj-
predvaritelno-soglasovali-avans-na-25-mlrd
25	 www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/news/26697541/novatek-dogovorilsya-s-cn-
pc	-o-postavkah-3-mln-t-szhizhennogo;	www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/
news/26837031/yamal-spg-mozhet-poluchit-do-20-mlrd-ot-kitaya.	 It	 is	worth	
adding	that	CNPC	holds	a	20%	stake	in	the	Yamal-LNG	project.
26	 http://news.kremlin.ru/transcripts/21078.	 Lack	 of	 confirmation	 from	 the	
Chinese	side	suggests	that	this	statement	was	aimed	at	putting	pressure	on	
European	buyers	of	Russian	gas,	and	the	project	itself	remains	at	the	plan-
ning	stage.	
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discussion	on	the	need	for	European	Union	member	states	to	re-
duce	imports	of	Russian	oil	and	gas.	Given	this	situation,	Russia	
wanted	especially	 strongly	 to	demonstrate	 its	 capabilities	of	di-
versifying	gas	exports.	Furthermore,	the	signing	of	the	contract	
was	meant	to	send	a	political	signal	to	the	West,	proving	that	the	
Western	rhetoric	of	‘isolating’	Russia	was	unrealistic.	
One	could	put	forward	the	thesis	that	Russia	is	gradually	building	
up	an	energy	alliance	with	China.	This	alliance	will	be	based	on	
long-term	contracts	for	supplies	of	large	quantities	of	oil	and	gas,	
which	will	 be	partly	prepaid	by	China.	Russia	 also	 seems	 to	be	
interested	in	having	the	Chinese	provide	investments	for	the	de-
velopment	of	Russian	oil	and	gas	fields	as	an	integral	part	of	such	
an	alliance27.	Traditionally,	this	alliance	will	also	include	Russia’s	
participation	in	constructing	nuclear	power	plants	in	China28.	
The	economic	deals	struck	during	Russian	Prime	Minister	Dmit-
ry	Medvedev’s	most	recent	visit	to	China	in	autumn	2013	suggest	
that	China	and	Russia	are	trying	to	gradually	shift	to	a	model	of	
economic	co-operation	in	which	Chinese	companies	would	invest	
in	 projects	 located	 in	 the	 Russian	 Federation29.	 The	 recent	 an-
nouncement	by	the	chairman	of	the	China	Chamber	of	Commerce	
for	Import	and	Export	of	Machinery	and	Electronic	Products	that	
27	 As	a	part	of	the	contract	with	Novatek	for	LNG	supplies,	China’s	state-con-
trolled	company	CNPC	bought	a	20%	stake	in	the	Yamal	SPG	project,	which	
is	 planned	 to	 provide	 the	 natural	 gas	 to	 be	 supplied	 under	 the	 contract;	
Rosneft	 reached	 an	 agreement	 with	 CNPC	 in	 autumn	 2013	 under	 which	
a	joint	venture	was	established	to	operate	the	oil	and	gas	fields	in	the	Sred-
nebotuobinskoye	project	in	Eastern	Siberia.	Rosneft	would	own	51%	of	the	
shares,	and	CNPC	49%.
28	 An	 intergovernmental	 agreement	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 two	 nuclear	 re-
actors	(worth	US$1.8	billion)	for	the	Tianwan	nuclear	power	plant	built	by	
Russia	 in	 1997–2007	 was	 signed	 in	 December	 2012;	 http://en.ria.ru/busi-
ness/20100209/157817046.html
29	 The	firm	Metally	Vostochnoy	Sibiri	signed	an	agreement	with	China’s	NFC	
on	the	construction	and	joint	operation	(on	50:50	basis)	of	the	Ozernoye	rare	
earth	metals	mine	and	processing	plant	in	Buryatia;	in	turn	Vneshekonom-
bank	signed	three	loan	agreements	with	the	state-controlled	China	Devel-
opment	Bank	worth	US$1.9	billion	in	total.
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China	would	like	to	increase	its	investments	in	Russia	to	a	level	of	
US$12	billion	by	2020	(the	present	level	of	Chinese	direct	invest-
ments	is	US$3.5	billion)	indicates	that	China	is	ready	to	intensify	
its	investment	involvement	in	Russia30.	
The	 development	 of	 co-operation	 in	 the	 energy	 sector	 and	 the	
spectacular	growth	in	bilateral	trade	volumes	have	to	some	extent	
overshadowed	Russian-Chinese	military-technical	co-operation,	
which	used	to	form	the	most	important	component	of	mutual	eco-
nomic	relations	in	the	1990s.	Still,	China	continues	to	be	the	third	
largest	 client	 of	 the	Russian	 arms	 industry.	 It	 can	be	 estimated	
on	the	basis	of	available	data	 that	 the	value	of	Russian	military	
exports	 to	China	 in	 2008–2011	 stood	on	average	 at	US$800–900	
million	annually	(this	accounted	for	around	10%	of	total	Russian	
arms	exports	within	this	timeframe),	and	rose	to	US$1–1.5	billion	
annually	in	2012–2013.	Negotiations	on	two	multibillion	contracts	
for	combat	aircraft	and	submarines	are	underway31.	
The	 scope	 of	military-technical	 co-operation	between	Moscow	
and	Beijing	has	been	quite	narrow	over	the	past	few	years.	Rus-
sia	 exports	 mainly	 aircraft	 engines	 and	 helicopters.	 Further-
more,	 a	 programme	 envisaging	 the	 production	 in	 China	 on	
Russian	 licence	of	 the	Tigr	 armoured	vehicle	 is	now	being	 im-
plemented32.	However,	two	high-value	contracts	are	being	nego-
tiated	at	present:	one	on	the	sale	of	24	Su-35	fourth-generation	
combat	aircraft;	and	another	to	supply	two	submarines,	as	well	
30	 http://itar-tass.com/ekonomika/695575	
31	 Tsentr	 Analiza	 Mirovoy	 Torgovli	 Oruzhiyem,	 Kitay v strukture mirovogo 
importa vooruzheniy,	 2012,	 table	 7,	 p.	 5;	 http://www.armstrade.org/files/
analytics/304.pdf;	http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/main-
news/2012/1120/103015758/detail.shtml,	20	November	2012;	Vassily	Kashin	
from	the	Centre	for	Analysis	of	Strategies	and	Technologies,	quoted	by	In-
terfax-AVN,	13	 January	2013;	David	Lague,	 ‘China	eyes	$3.5	billion	Russian	
arms	deal	despite	ire	over	Sukhoi	copy’,	27	March	2013;	http://www.reuters.
com/article/2013/03/27/us-china-russia-arms-idUSBRE92Q0PE20130327	
32	 http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/mainnews/2012/1120/103015758/
detail.shtml,	20	November	2012.
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as	the	licence	to	build	more	in	China.	It	had	been	announced	that	
the	Su-35	contract,	worth	around	US$2	billion,	would	be	signed	
in	November	2013,	but	Russian	 sources	 reported	 in	September	
2013	 that	 this	would	 not	 happen	 before	 2014.	 The	 contract	 for	
submarine	 construction	 is	 expected	 to	 be	finalised	 in	 2015;	 its	
estimated	value	is	US$1.5	billion33.	
However,	 Chinese-Russian	 military	 co-operation	 extends	 far	
beyond	 the	 export	 of	Russian	 equipment	 and	 technologies.	 It	 is	
worth	 noting	 the	 frequency	 and	 the	 scale	 of	 Russian-Chinese	
military	exercises	conducted	either	under	the	aegis	of	the	Shang-
hai	Co-operation	Organisation	or	on	a	bilateral	basis.	With	regard	
to	no	other	state	(outside	the	CIS)	does	Russia	demonstrate	such	
a	degree	of	openness	to	military	co-operation.	Between	2003	and	
2013,	Russia	and	China	have	held	together	ten	military	exercises	
in	which	between	1300	and	10,000	military	personnel	participated	
each	time.	Two	large	training	events	were	held	in	2013:	maritime	
exercises	(in	the	Pacific	Ocean)	with	the	participation	of	nineteen	
ships;	 and	 land	 exercises	 at	 the	 Chebarkul	 training	 ground	 in	
Russia.	The	Chinese	President	Xi	 Jinping’s	tour	of	the	command	
centre	of	the	Russian	armed	forces,	unprecedented	for	a	foreign	
leader,	 	during	his	visit	 to	Moscow	in	March	2013	was	meant	 to	
demonstrate	Russia’s	openness	and	the	special	nature	of	military	
cooperation	between	the	two	countries.	Although	both	sides	have	
emphasised	they	have	no	intention	of	entering	a	military	alliance,	
one	may	come	across	the	opinion	that	“basic	conditions	are	being	
created	for	such	an	alliance	in	the	military	and	technical	spheres	
through	holding	more	and	more	complex	and	extensive	joint	mili-
tary	exercises	and	through	enhancement	of	contacts	between	the	
military	personnel	of	the	two	countries.”34
33	 Interfax-AVN,	6	March	2013;	http://ria.ru/defense_safety/20130907/961478852.
html,	7	September	2013.
34	 Vassily	Kashin,	 ‘Summa	vsekh	strakhov.	Faktor	kitayskoy	ugrozy	v	rossi-
yskoy	politike’,	Mirovoy Poryadok,	March-April	2013,	p.	78.
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It	is	worth	noting	that	for	the	sake	of	maintaining	good	relations	
with	 China,	 the	 Russian	 political	 establishment	 is	 ready	 to	 ac-
cept	a	kind	of	condominium	in	Central	Asia35.	Although	Moscow	
is	aware	of	China’s	increasing	economic	presence	in	the	region36	
and	is	concerned	that	this	could	lead	to	an	undermining	of	Rus-
sia’s	political	influence	there	to	China’s	benefit,	it	has	strenuously	
avoided	voicing	its	concerns	in	public.	The	Kremlin	seems	to	as-
sume	that	both	Russia	 itself	and	China	are	sufficiently	 interest-
ed	in	maintaining	good	mutual	relations	to	limit	their	rivalry	in	
this	region	and	to	find	a	mutual	accommodation	of	their	interests	
there37.	 Although	 the	 Kremlin	 has	 not	 given	 up	 its	 attempts	 to	
counteract	the	Chinese	economic	penetration	of	Central	Asia,	and	
has	been	making	efforts	to	include	Kyrgyzstan	and	Tajikistan	in	
the	Eurasian	Union,	at	the	same	time	it	appears	to	have	accepted	
the	need	 to	 tolerate	 it.	 It	 seems	determined	 to	find	a	modus viv-
endi	with	China	in	this	region,	based	on	a	division	of	responsibili-
ties	and	of	fields	of	activity:	Russia	would	maintain	its	prevalent	
political	 influence	and	its	predominance	in	the	area	of	security,	
while	China	would	predominate	in	the	economic	area,	even	if	the	
region	remains	institutionally	bound	to	the	Russian	economy	by	
membership	of	the	Eurasian	Union.	During	Vladimir	Putin’s	most	
recent	visit	to	Beijing,	Russia	and	China	signalled	their	readiness	
to	accommodate	mutual	interests	in	Central	Asia,	by	including	in	
a	 joint	 declaration	 a	 positive	 evaluation	 of	 each	 other’s	 flagship	
economic	integration	projects	in	the	region,	i.e.	Russia’s	Eurasian	
35	 See	for	example	the	reflections	in	the	memorandum	K Velikomu Okeanu, ili 
novaya globalizatsiya Rossii,	 pp.	 57–58	 and	60–61,	written	by	political	 ana-
lysts	closely	linked	to	the	Russian	establishment	and	published	under	the	
auspices	of	the	Valdai	Club.	
36	 See	Aleksandra	 Jarosiewicz,	Krzysztof	Strachota,	 ‘China	vs.	Central	Asia.	
The	achievements	of	the	past	two	decades’,	OSW Studies,	4	November	2013.
37	 The	author	has	been	led	to	believe,	on	the	basis	of	conversations	held	in	Bei-
jing	(9–10	June	2014)	with	Chinese	experts	from	the	China	Institutes	of	Con-
temporary	 International	 Relations	 and	 the	 Eurasian	 Social	 Development	
Research	Institute,	that	the	Kremlin’s	opinion	that	China	is	ready	for	a	mu-
tual	accommodation	of	interests	in	Central	Asia	and,	like	Russia,	does	not	
want	a	conflict	of	interests	in	the	region	to	undermine	the	‘strategic	part-
nership’	of	Moscow	and	Beijing,	is	accurate.
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Union	and	China’s	 ‘Silk	Road	Economic	Belt.’38	Furthermore,	the	
Chinese	side	manifested	its	readiness	to	soothe	Russian	concerns	
by	promising	to	take	Russian	interests	into	consideration	during	
the	preparation	and	implementation	of	its	project.
38	 Sections	20	and	21	of	the	‘Joint	declaration’	signed	on	20	May	2014,	http://
news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/1642
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iii. moscow–dElhi: a gEopolitical consEnsus
Russia’s	 relations	 with	 India	 draw	 upon	 the	 strategic	 alliance	
which	existed	during	the	Cold	War	between	India	and	the	Soviet	
Union.	These	can	be	summed	up	as	extremely	comfortable	–	with	
no	other	country	does	Russia	enjoy	such	unproblematic	political	
relations.	 To	 emphasise	 this	 state	 of	 affairs,	 Russian	 diplomacy	
refers	to	them	as	a	“specially	privileged	strategic	partnership”39.	
Russia	 and	 India	 have	 no	 conflicting	 interests	 in	 international	
politics,	 while	 having	 converging	 regional	 interests.	 The	 two	
countries	are	interested	in	the	stabilisation	of	Central	Asia,	and	
especially	of	Afghanistan;	and	they	both	view	the	intensification	
of	Islamic	radicalism	in	the	region	as	a	serious	threat.	They	also	
both	 perceive	 China’s	 growing	 power	 as	 a	 problem	 in	 the	 long	
term.	Russia	formally	supports	India’s	aspirations	to	a	permanent	
membership	on	the	UN	Security	Council.	Vyacheslav	Trubnikov,	
a	former	ambassador	of	the	Russian	Federation	to	India	and	cur-
rently	a	key	figure	on	the	Russian	International	Affairs	Council,	
which	 is	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	Russian	establishment,	 intimated	
publicly	during	 the	visit	by	 the	 Indian	prime	minister	Manmo-
han	Singh	to	Moscow	in	autumn	2013	that	India	should	be	granted	
not	only	a	permanent	membership	in	the	UN	Security	Council	but	
also	the	right	of	veto40.	This	might	portend	a	revision	of	the	official	
stance	of	Russian	diplomacy,	which	has	so	far	opposed	the	vesting	
of	possible	new	permanent	members	of	the	Security	Council	with	
the	 power	 of	 veto,	 as	 increasing	 the	 number	 of	 such	 countries	
would	mean	a	relative	weakening	of	Russia’s	own	position.	
Russia’s	economic	relations	with	India,	when	compared	with	Rus-
sia’s	 relations	 with	 China,	 display	 both	 similarities	 and	 differ-
ences.	What	is	similar	is	that	in	both	cases	it	is	the	energy	sector	
and	military-technical	cooperation	that	play	the	central	role.	The	
39	 See	for	example:	Osnovnyie vneshnepoliticheskiye sobytiya 2013 goda,	section	
13,	www.mid.ru.
40	 Krasnaya Zvezda,	29.10.2013.
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differences	include	the	scale	of	trade,	which	in	the	case	of	India	is	
much	smaller:	in	2012,	Russian-Indian	trade	volume	reached	only	
US$11	billion.	The	trade	structure	is	also	different	and	(from	Rus-
sia’s	point	of	view)	healthier.	The	trade	balance	is	positive	for	Rus-
sia,	and	Russian	exports	consist	predominantly	of	products	of	the	
machine-building	industry	(almost	49%	in	2012)41.	The	export	of	
weapons	and	military	technologies	plays	a	much	more	important	
role	in	economic	relations	with	India	than	in	Russian-Chinese	re-
lations.	India	has	been	the	Russian	arms	industry’s	biggest	client	
for	years:	the	value	of	contracts	implemented	in	2008-2011	stood	
at	US$7.2	billion,	and	in	2012	alone	it	reached	US$7.3	billion42.	This	
sum	nearly	equalled	the	value	of	civilian	Russian	exports	(US$8	
billion).	The	portfolio	of	orders	for	March	2013	was	worth	US$10.3	
billion43.	According	to	some	estimates,	India	accounts	for	around	
30%	of	total	Russian	arms	exports.	The	estimated	annual	value	of	
supplies	 is	 around	US$3	billion.	The	 contracts	which	have	been	
signed	 and	 are	 currently	 being	 implemented	 are	worth	 around	
US$20	billion44.	
To	 no	 other	 country,	 except	 for	 India,	 does	 Russia	 sell	 equally	
advanced	 military	 technologies	 and	 an	 equally	 broad	 range	 of	
weapons,	from	small	arms	to	warships.	In	November	2013,	the	In-
dian	flag	was	hoisted	on	an	aircraft	carrier	bought	from	Russia,	
after	 it	 had	 been	 thoroughly	modernised	 and	 re-fitted.	 In	 2012,	
India	 leased	 a	Russian	nuclear-powered	 submarine.	Russia	 also	
supplies	 India	 with	 shipborne	 fighter	 jets	 (MiG-29K/KUB)	 and	
Mi-17B-5	transport	helicopters.	
Furthermore,	co-production	based	on	high	technologies	occupies	
a	 significant	 niche	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 both	 military-technical	 and	
41	 Torgovo-ekonomicheskoye sotrudnichestvo mezhdu Rossiyskoi Federatsiyei i Indiyei 
za 2012 g.,	http://www.ved.gov.ru/files/images/kai/TES_Rus_Ind_2012.pdf
42	 Tsentr	 Analiza	Mirovoy	 Torgovli	 Oruzhiyem,	 Osnovnyie programmy mod-
ernizatsii VS Indii v 2011-2012 gg.,	2012,	pp.	3-4.
43	 RSMD,	Tezisy o rossiysko-indiyskikh otnosheniyakh,	p.18.
44	 Interfax-AVN,	15	November	2013.
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‘civilian’	 co-operation.	Currently,	a	number	of	 joint	projects	are	
being	 implemented,	 involving	 joint	design	and	 future	manufac-
ture	of	combat	aircraft	and	guided	missiles.	India	already	manu-
factures	Su-30MKI	fighter	jets	and	tanks	on	Russian	licence.	
Co-operation	in	the	energy	sector	in	Russia’s	relations	with	India	
plays	a	 significantly	 smaller	 role	 compared	 to	 its	 relations	with	
Beijing.	The	nature	of	this	co-operation	is	also	different.	India	im-
ports	only	small	amounts	of	Russian	oil,	but	 its	state-controlled	
corporation	ONGC	Videsh	Ltd.	has	invested	around	US$4.3	billion	
in	oil	extraction	in	Russia.	Videsh	has	acquired	a	20%	stake	in	the	
Sakhalin-1	 project,	 and	 has	 bought	 Imperial	 Energy,	 a	 firm	 en-
gaged	in	oil	production	in	Western	Siberia.	Gazprom	is	planning	
to	start	exporting	 liquefied	natural	gas	under	a	contract	 signed	
with	Indian	firms	envisaging	annual	supplies	of	between	7.5	and	
10	bcm45.	
During	 the	 most	 recent	 visit	 by	 then-PM	Manmohan	 Singh	 to	
Moscow	 in	 autumn	 2013,	 Russia	 suggested	 building	 a	 gas	 pipe-
line	that	would	run	from	Western	Siberia	to	India	via	the	Chinese	
province	of	Xinjiang.	The	estimated	value	of	this	project	is	US$30	
billion;	a	Russian-Indian	group	has	been	established	to	study	this	
proposal,	and	India’s	largest	oil	and	gas	company,	ONGC,	has	ex-
pressed	interest	in	the	project46.	
45	 This	 information	can	be	 found	on	the	website	of	 India’s	embassy	 in	Moscow;	
http://www.indianembassy.ru/index.php/en/economic-cooperation/overview
46	 John	Dalym,	 ‘Russia,	India	Planning	$30	Billion	Oil	Pipeline	Through	Xin-
jiang’;	 http://oilprice.com/Energy-General/Russia-India-Planning-30-Bil-
lion-Oil-Pipeline-Through-Xinjiang.html
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iv. russian-JapanEsE rElations: a fruitful 
‘stratEgic patiEncE’ 
Unlike	 the	 warm	 and	 close	 political	 contacts	 with	 Beijing	 and	
Delhi,	Moscow’s	 relations	with	 the	 third	 regional	Asian	power,	
Japan,	have	 long	been	 overshadowed	by	 the	unresolved	 territo-
rial	 dispute	 over	 the	 Kuril	 Islands.	 Russian-Japanese	 relations,	
albeit	 correct,	 have	 remained	 cold.	 The	 Russian	 side,	 following	
President	Putin’s	unsuccessful	attempt	in	2001	to	resolve	the	dis-
pute	through	a	compromise	based	on	the	joint	declaration	signed	
in	 1956	 and	 envisaging	 the	 division	 of	 the	 disputed	 archipelago	
between	Russia	and	Japan47,	has	evidently	adopted	the	method	of	
‘strategic	patience’,	hoping	that	Tokyo	will	sooner	or	later	become	
ready	to	accept	the	compromise.	Moscow	has	not	seemed	particu-
larly	concerned	that	the	unresolved	conflict	has	hampered	the	de-
velopment	of	economic	co-operation,	and	in	particular	restricted	
the	opportunities	to	use	Japanese	capital	to	improve	the	economic	
situation	in	Russia’s	Far	East.	Instead,	it	has	consistently	suggest-
ed	 to	 Japan	that	economic	co-operation	 issues	should	be	viewed	
separately	from	the	territorial	dispute.	
The	Kremlin	appeared	to	hope	that,	as	China’s	power	grew	and	the	
Japanese-Chinese	territorial	dispute	became	more	serious,	Tokyo	
would	become	sufficiently	interested	in	improving	relations	with	
Moscow	that	it	would	be	ready	to	accept	the	Russian	terms.	
The	 Russian	 strategy	 has	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 successful.	 A	 ‘small	
breakthrough’	 regarding	 the	 disputed	 islands	 was	 seen	 dur-
ing	 the	 visit	 by	 Japan’s	 prime	minister,	 Shinzo	Abe,	 to	Moscow	
in	April	2013.	Given	the	growing	Chinese	threat,	 Japan	accepted	
the	 Russian	 terms	 for	 resolving	 the	 dispute:	 the	 parties	 agreed	
to	 separate	 the	 issues	of	 economic	co-operation	 from	 territorial	
problems,	to	resume	formal	consultations	preceding	the	signing	
47	 According	to	this	declaration,	two	islets	in	the	disputed	archipelago,	Shiko-
tan	and	Habomai,	could	be	relinquished	by	the	Soviet	Union.	
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of	a	peace	treaty,	and	to	raise	the	level	of	mutual	relations.	It	was	
also	agreed	that	the	ministers	of	defence	and	foreign	affairs	would	
meet	periodically	to	hold	consultations	(in	the	2+2	format)48.	
The	 first	 consultations	 since	 2006	 concerning	 the	 peace	 treaty	
were	held	in	August	2013,	and	the	first	ministerial	meeting	in	the	
2+2	format	followed	in	November	2013.
In	his	comment	on	this	meeting,	which	was	a	sign	of	a	significant	
improvement	 of	 relations	 between	Moscow	 and	 Tokyo,	 Russia’s	
foreign	 minister	 Sergey	 Lavrov	 characteristically	 denied	 out-
right	 that	 a	 Russian-Japanese	 rapprochement	 could	 in	 any	way	
be	directed	against	Beijing.	However,	he	implied	that	by	building	
constructive	relations	with	Tokyo,	Moscow	is	helping	Japan	to	re-
duce	 its	dependence	on	Washington.	 In	other	words,	Moscow	is	
strengthening	its	position	with	regard	to	Beijing,	but	at	the	same	
time	it	is	also	acting	in	its	own	interest	by	loosening	the	US-Japa-
nese	alliance49.
Despite	the	ongoing	territorial	dispute	and	cool	political	relations,	
economic	 co-operation	 has	 been	 developing	 very	 dynamically.	
Mutual	trade	volume	increased	by	59%	in	2010,	by	29%	in	2011,	by	
5%	in	2012	and	by	6.6%	in	2013,	reaching	US$33.2	billion.	However,	
the	trade	structure	is	extremely	unfavourable	for	Russia,	at	least	
from	the	point	of	view	of	Moscow’s	declared	ambitions	to	make	its	
exports	more	‘sophisticated’.	Russian	exports	consist	almost	en-
tirely	(98%)	of	raw	materials:	crude	oil,	natural	gas,	coal,	metals,	
wood	and	maritime	products.	 In	turn,	most	of	 its	 imports	(85%)	
are	products	of	the	automotive,	machine-building	and	electronic	
industries.	
48	 Dmitry	 Kosyrev,	‘Yaponsko-rossiyskaya	 perezagruzka	 s	 perezapuskom’,	
Nezavisimaya Gazeta,	29	April	2013.
49	 ITAR-TASS,	2	November	2013,	 ‘Tokyo	ishchet	kompromis	s	Moskvoi’,	Rossiys-
kaya Gazeta, 27	December	2013;	http://www.rg.ru/2013/12/27/peregovory.html
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Paradoxically,	while	political	relations	between	Moscow	and	To-
kyo	have	been	far	from	the	level	Moscow	has	achieved	in	its	rela-
tions	with	Beijing	and	Delhi,	Japan	is	the	largest	Asian	investor	
in	Russia.	 In	 2012,	 total	 Japanese	 investments	 reached	US$10.7	
billion50.
Co-operation	in	the	energy	sector	is	the	core	of	Russian-Japanese	
relations.	The	majority	of	Japanese	investments	(86.3%)	are	made	
in	this	sector51.	Japan’s	largest	investments	have	included	partici-
pation	in	oil	and	gas	production	consortiums	in	Sakhalin:	Sakha-
lin-1	 (30%)	 and	Sakhalin-2	 (22.5%).	As	 a	 consequence,	 Japan	has	
become	 the	 main	 recipient	 (76%)52	 of	 Russian	 liquefied	 natural	
gas	exports	and	a	major	importer	of	Russian	crude	oil.	Between	
2005	and	2010,	Russian	oil	exports	to	Japan	increased	by	over	five	
times,	reaching	13.1	million	tonnes	(7%	of	Japanese	oil	imports)53.	
Both	sides	have	shown	interest	 in	enhancing	their	co-operation	
in	this	area.	Gazpromneft	revealed	in	June	2013	that	Japan’s	state-
controlled	 company	 JOGMEC	 had	 acquired	 a	 49%	 stake	 in	 the	
Chonskoye	gas	fields	and	would	invest	US$100	million	in	the	op-
eration	of	these	fields54.	In	May	2013,	Rosneft	signed	an	agreement	
with	Japan’s	state-owned	company	INPEX	setting	up	a	joint	ven-
ture	 in	charge	of	operating	oil	fields	on	 the	Sea	of	Okhotsk55.	 In	
June	2013,	Gazprom	and	the	Japan	Far	Eastern	Gas	Co.	consortium	
signed	a	memorandum	of	co-operation	to	start	an	LNG	project	in	
Vladivostok.	This	plant	will	produce	15	million	tonnes	of	gas	an-
50	 ‘O	 rossiysko-yaponskikh	 ekonomicheskikh	 otnosheniyakh’,	 7	 November	
2013;	http://www.russia-emb.jp/embassy/economic.html	
51	 According	 to	data	 for	2010;	http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/jp/jp_
ru_relations/jp_rus_projects/	
52	 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=rs
53	 Stanislav	Zhukov,	‘Vostochny	azimut	rossiyskoi	energetiki’,	17	January	2012;	
http://www.ecpol.ru/2012-04-05-13-42-46/2012-04-05-13-43-05/144-vostoch-
nyj-azimut-rossijskoj-energetiki.html
54	 http://ru.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idRUMSE95602C20130607
55	 ITAR-TASS,	29	May	2013.
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nually,	beginning	in	2018,	70%	of	which	will	be	sold	to	the	Japanese	
market56.	In	turn,	the	CEO	of	Rosneft,	Igor	Sechin,	declared	dur-
ing	the	fourth	Russian-Japanese	investment	forum	in	April	2014	
that	his	 company	was	 ready	 to	provide	 Japanese	 investors	with	
access	to	its	oil	and	gas	fields	as	part	of	an	assets	swap57.	
56	 Céline	 Pajon,	 ‘Japan-Russia:	 Toward	 a	 Strategic	 Partnership?’,	Russie.Nei. 
Visions	no.	72;	September	2013,	p.8.
57	 Rustem	Falakhov,	‘Japonii	Krym	ne	pomekha’,	19	March	2014,	
http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2014/03/19/5955961.shtml
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
1/
20
14
29
v. russia and thE multilatEral 
structurEs in thE rEgion
Moscow’s	 consistent	 efforts	 to	 join	 the	multilateral	 regional	 or-
ganisations,	 or	 establish	 a	 formal	 partnership	 with	 them	 (the	
Asia-Pacific	Economic	Co-operation	 (APEC)	 forum,	 the	ASEAN–
ARF	Regional	Forum,	the	Defence	Ministers	Meeting	ASEAN+8,	
the	East	Asia	Summit	(EAS),	the	‘Asia-Europe’	Forum),	have	been	
another	element	of	Russia’s	strategy	aimed	at	reinforcing	its	po-
sition	 in	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 region.	 Formally,	 Russia	 has	 achieved	
spectacular	successes	in	this	area:	in	2011	it	(along	with	the	United	
States)	was	granted	membership	in	the	EAS,	the	last	multilateral	
organisation	it	was	still	not	a	member	of,	and	it	hosted	the	annual	
APEC	summit	in	Vladivostok	in	2012.	
Regardless	of	these	formal	successes,	and	of	Russia’s	undoubtedly	
more	active	presence	 in	the	regional	structures,	one	could	have	
the	impression	that	Russia	has	no	clear	vision	of	how	it	could	take	
advantage	of	 this	 engagement.	Russian	diplomacy	has	been	un-
able	to	generate	any	major	 initiatives	to	make	Russia	to	be	seen	
as	a	“model	citizen	of	 the	region”	 for	other	countries,	and	as	an	
integral	part	of	the	Asia-Pacific	region58.	
The	 only	major	Russian	 initiative	was	 the	 2010	 proposal	 to	 im-
prove	 regional	 security	 through	 developing	 framework	 proce-
dures	by	the	region’s	countries	in	this	field.	However	these	rules,	
which	are	by	the	way	very	similar	to	those	put	forward	by	Russian	
diplomacy	for	the	Euro-Atlantic	area,	seem	above	all	to	be	aimed	
at	weakening	US	military	alliances	in	the	region.	This	initiative	
cannot	be	appealing	to	most	countries	 in	this	region,	which	are	
concerned	about	China’s	growing	power,	including	military	pow-
er,	since	it	fails	to	offer	them	any	security	guarantees	as	opposed	
to	 those	 they	have	been	given	by	 the	USA.	For	 this	 reason,	 this	
58	 An	apt	term	and	observation	by	Bobo	Lo,	‘Russia’s	Eastern	Direction-Distin-
guishing	the	Real	from	the	Virtual’,	January	2014,	p.	21.
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initiative	–	which	(not	coincidentally)	was	announced	jointly	with	
Beijing	and	reiterated	(also	with	Beijing)	in	2012	at	the	EAS	sum-
mit	in	the	form	of	a	proposal	to	start	multilateral	dialogue	in	or-
der	to	create	a	‘security	architecture’	in	the	region59	–	has	put	Rus-
sia	in	the	position	of	Beijing’s	assistant,	rather	than	that	of	a	state	
which	could	help	resolve	the	problems	caused	by	the	disturbance	
of	the	regional	balance	resulting	from	China’s	growing	power.	
59	 Speech	by	 the	Russian	deputy	minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs,	 Igor	Morgulov,	
5	 July	2013;	http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/fa711a859c4b9396432569
99005bcbbc/9668ef80b55334ad44257b82003e03d0!OpenDocument;	 Speech	
by	 the	 Russian	 minister	 of	 foreign	 affairs,	 Sergey	 Lavrov,	 20	 November	
2012;	 http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/997e7b027bbf661cc3256f6d005
40731/5fcfa53c9c52b32244257abc003a55e6!OpenDocument	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
1/
20
14
31
vi. thE russian rEsponsE to thE asian 
challEngEs
Russia	sees	the	new	balance	of	forces	which	has	begun	to	emerge	on	
the	international	arena	as	a	consequence	of	the	spectacular	growth	
of	the	Asian	countries’,	and	above	all	China’s,	economic	potential,	as	
presenting	both	new	challenges	and	new	opportunities.	
One	of	the	challenges	is	the	increasing	contrast	between	the	Rus-
sian	Far	East,	which	is	stuck	in	economic	stagnation,	and	the	rapid-
ly	developing	countries	in	this	region	(with	the	exception	of	North	
Korea),	which	has	created	the	risk	of	economic	marginalisation	for	
Russia.	The	rapid	growth	of	China’s	power	is	seen	as	another	chal-
lenge.	 The	 deepening	 asymmetry	 –	 to	 Russia’s	 disadvantage	 –	 of	
the	two	countries’	potentials	gives	rise	to	the	risk	that	in	the	long	
run	Russia	might	become	unilaterally	dependent	on	China,	and	as	
a	consequence	lose	its	position	as	an	equal	partner	of	Beijing.	
On	the	other	hand,	Russia	has	been	offered	the	opportunity	to	ex-
ploit	the	economic	dynamism	of	the	Asia-Pacific	region	not	only	to	
boost	the	economic	development	of	its	Far	East	region	but	also	to	
diversify	its	sources	of	investments	and	trade	markets;	this	might	
reduce	 Russia’s	 economic	 dependence	 on	 its	Western	 partners.	
The	growing	power	of	China	has	also	opened	up	new	opportuni-
ties	 for	Russia.	An	ever	 stronger	Chinese	partner	could	become	
a	kind	of	an	insurance	policy	against	the	West.	Furthermore,	in-
tensifying	disagreements	between	Beijing	and	Washington	have	
put	Moscow	 in	a	 convenient	position;	 even	 if	both	 rival	powers	
are	not	competing	for	Russia’s	favours,	at	least	they	cannot	allow	
themselves	to	treat	it	in	a	way	which	could	push	it	into	their	ri-
val’s	arms60.	In	the	Asia-Pacific	region	itself,	rising	Chinese	power	
automatically	makes	Russia	more	appealing	as	a	partner	to	other	
60	 See	 for	 example	 statements	 by	 Gennady	 Chufrin	 (IMEMO	 RAN),	 Sergey	
Luzyanin	 (RAS	 Institute	 of	 Far	 Eastern	 Studies),	 Igor	 Zevelev	 (Moscow	
branch	of	the	MacArthur	Foundation),	‘Protivoborstvo	Kitaya	i	SShA	v	Azii:	
Vyvody	dla	Rossii’,	Index Bezopasnosti	no.	2	(101),	vol.18,	pp.	104,	108,	111,	112.
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countries	in	this	region:	India,	 Japan,	the	Republic	of	Korea	and	
the	ASEAN	countries	(above	all	Vietnam).
The	Kremlin’s	 response	 to	 this	 situation	has	 been	 equally	 com-
plex,	 and	 consists	 of	 three	 parts.	 Firstly,	 the	Kremlin	has	 been	
making	efforts	to	deepen	its	political	and	economic	relations	with	
Beijing,	in	order	to	safeguard	Russia	from	the	possibility	of	con-
flict	with	China.	By	becoming	Beijing’s	valued	partner,	Moscow	
has	been	making	China	more	and	more	interested	in	maintaining	
good	mutual	 relations,	and	has	been	 increasing	 the	cost	Beijing	
would	have	to	pay	should	it	come	into	conflict	with	Russia.	Sec-
ondly	the	Kremlin,	by	capitalising	on	the	other	Asian	countries’	
concern	with	China’s	growing	power,	has	been	actively	develop-
ing	political	and	economic	relations	with	them,	above	all	with	the	
regional	great	powers,	India	and	Japan.	Thus	it	has	been	striving	
towords	geopolitical	and	geoeconomic	diversification	in	order	not	
to	become	unilaterally	dependent	on	Beijing.	Thirdly,	the	Krem-
lin	has	been	making	attempts	to	use	its	relations	with	Asian	part-
ners,	above	all	China,	to	give	itself	more	room	for	manoeuvre	in	
its	relations	with	the	West,	including	first	of	all	with	the	United	
States.	In	other	words,	by	developing	its	relations	with	its	Eastern	
partners,	Moscow	has	been	aiming	at	achieving	 the	goal	 that	 it	
had	already	proclaimed	in	the	1990s:	 the	construction	of	a	new,	
polycentric	 international	 order	 to	 replace	 the	 US-centric	 post-
Cold	War	order.
From	the	Kremlin’s	point	of	view,	relations	with	Beijing	and	Delhi	
reflect	to	the	greatest	extent	its	vision	of	what	relations	between	
great	powers	should	be	like	in	the	new	order61.	It	is	precisely	in	
61	 For	example,	see	the	characteristics	of	Russian-Chinese	relations	present-
ed	 in	 the	 statement	 from	 the	 Russian	 ambassador	 in	 Beijing,	 Sergey	 Ra-
zov:	 ‘Pragmatizm	 vmesto	 pretenzii	 i	 nedoveriya’,	Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn	
11	(2009),	or	the	declaration	made	by	the	Russian	deputy	minister	of	foreign	
affairs,	 Igor	Morgulov,	during	the	 ‘round	table’	meeting	regarding	the	se-
curity	of	the	Asia-Pacific	region,	5	June	2013,	and	Russian-Chinese	relations	
which	“can	become	a	model	for	interstate	relations	of	two	great	powers	in	
the	21st	century”;	www.mid.ru.	
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its	relations	with	the	key	Asian	partners	where	Moscow	wants	to	
develop	the	‘exemplary’	model	for	the	coexistence	of	the	main	po-
litical	centres	of	the	emerging	 ‘polycentric’	 international	order.	
This	model	provides	for	a	mutual	respect	of	strategic	autonomy	
(i.e.	not	being	bound	by	 formal	 obligations	 as	 allies)	 and	zones	
of	influence,	mutual	non-interference	in	each	other’s	internal	af-
fairs,	refraining	from	‘exporting’	one’s	own	values	and	political	
systems,	 pragmatic	 economic	 co-operation	 (i.e.	without	 regard	
to	 any	 ideological	 restrictions),	 and	 the	 search	 for	 compromise	
in	regional	 issues.	 In	 its	 relations	with	Beijing	and	Delhi	alike,	
Moscow	 has	 emphasised	 the	 complete	 political	 harmony	 and	
similarity	of	interests	and	views	on	both	the	fundamental	rules	
of	 operation	of	 the	new	 international	 order	 as	well	 as	 regional	
crises	and	problems.	Thus	Moscow	has	been	suggesting,	more	or	
less	obliquely,	that	the	main	threat	to	the	new	international	or-
der	which	is	desired	by	all	three	countries	is	posed	by	Washing-
ton’s	aspirations	to	hegemony,	and	more	broadly,	by	 ‘messianic’	
impulses	 from	 the	 West.	 In	 practice	 this	 means	 coordinating	
their	positions	at	the	UN	and	other	international	organisations.	
For	example,	Russia	and	China	use	 their	veto	power	 in	 similar	
situations,	and	usually	jointly,	in	the	UN	Security	Council.	Over	
the	past	few	years	all	three	states	have	demonstrated	the	desire	
to	 create	 international	 formats	 and	 organisations:	 BRICS,	 the	
Shanghai	 Cooperation	 Organisation	 and	 RIC	 (trilateral	 Russia-
China-India	 consultations),	 with	 an	 intention	 of	 making	 them	
into	 alternatives	 to	 the	 institutions	 created	 and	 dominated	 by	
“the	West”.	Moscow	vests	particular	hopes	 in	 the	BRICS	 struc-
ture	as	a	“platform	for	promoting	a	non-Western	agenda”	in	the	
global	context62.	At	the	same	time,	all	three	countries	have	been	
pressing	 for	reform	of	 international	organisations	 like	 the	 IMF	
and	G20,	so	that	their	rules	of	operation	increasingly	correspond	
to	the	interests	of	the	new	non-Western	powers.	
62	 Dmitry	 Trenin,	 ‘New	 era	 of	 Sino-Russian	 tandem	 begins’,	 Global Times,	
21	March	2013;	www.globaltimes.cn
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vii. thE lamE Economy
If	the	Russian	policy	of	‘turning	to	the	East’	can	be	recognised	as	
having	had	moderate	success	in	the	area	of	politics	and	diplomacy,	
it	has	failed	to	bring	the	expected	economic	results.	Even	invest-
ing	US$21	billion	in	the	spectacular	preparation	of	the	APEC	sum-
mit	in	Vladivostok	in	2012	has	not	helped63.	
Russia	has	not	succeeded	in	significantly	increasing	the	share	of	
Asian	countries	in	its	foreign	trade	or	in	improving	its	structure.	
In	2008–2013,	the	share	of	countries	from	the	Asia-Pacific	region	
in	Russian	foreign	trade	(excluding	the	two	Americas	but	includ-
ing	 India)	 rose	 from	 17.1%	 to	 21.9%,	while	 the	European	Union’s	
share	 fell	 from	52%	 to	49.4%64.	Asian	markets	 still	 absorb	a	 rel-
atively	small	part	of	Russian	oil	and	gas	exports.	In	2012,	15%	of	
Russian	oil	exports	were	sold	to	Asian	markets	 (as	compared	to	
6%	in	2009),	7%	of	natural	gas,	10%	of	petroleum	products	and	23%	
coal	exports65.	The	Asian	markets’	share	in	exports	has	been	in-
creasing,	but	quite	slowly,	and	even	the	fact	that	the	large	gas	con-
tract	was	signed	with	China	in	May	2014	will	not	radically	change	
the	picture.	
The	Russian	economic	offer	to	Asian	partners	does	not	seem	to	be	
changing	either.	It	is	still	restricted	to	the	energy	sector	(oil	and	
gas	exports,	oil	and	gas	production	and	processing,	the	construc-
tion	of	nuclear	power	plants)	and	the	arms	trade.	
It	seems	that	Moscow	hopes	that	the	Asian	economic	giants	will	
become	an	important	alternative	to	Western	economic	partners,	
63	 See	the	evaluations	in	the	report	of	the	Valdai	Club:	Sergey	Karaganov	(ed.),	
K Velikomu Okeanu–2, ili rossiyskiy ryvok k Azii,	Moscow,	February	2014,	pp.	5,	
11	and	13.
64	 My	own	calculations	based	on	foreign	trade	statistics	from	the	Federal	Sta-
tistical	Service	of	the	Russian	Federation;	www.gks.ru
65	 Aleksandr	 Panov,	 Integratsiya Rossii v Aziatsko-Tikhookeansky region. Pers-
pektivy 2020,	2	April	2013;	http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1641#top
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offering	outlets	 that	will	 guarantee	 a	 growing	 revenue	flow	 for	
the	Russian	budget	as	well	as	the	investment	capital	necessary	to	
exploit	and	develop	Russian	natural	resources.	 In	 the	Kremlin’s	
opinion,	the	intensification	of	economic	relations	with	India	and	
China,	 unlike	 its	 co-operation	with	Western	partners,	 does	not	
entail	 any	 political	 risk	 in	 the	 form	 of	 open	 or	 covert	 pressure	
on	 Russian	 elites	 to	 adopt	Western	 rules	 in	 business	 and	 poli-
tics	(democratisation),	or	of	Western	values	permeating	Russian	
elites	and	society	at	large.	It	is	probably	relevant	that	the	model	of	
state-business	relations	in	all	three	countries	provides	for	a	much	
greater	degree	for	the	‘manual	steering’	of	the	international	oper-
ations	of	large	corporations	than	is	the	case	in	Western	countries.	
The	Russian	elite	may	thus	feel	more	at	home	doing	business	with	
partners	which	operate	within	a	similar	business	logic,	wherein	
politics	is	closely	intertwined	with	the	economy.	
The	 lack	of	a	 solid	economic	 foundation	may	mean	 that	 the	un-
doubted	 achievements	 of	 the	 Russian	 policy	 of	 ‘turning	 to	 the	
East’,	such	as	the	reinforcement	of	Russia’s	political	and	diplomat-
ic	position,	may	in	the	longer	term	prove	to	be	illusory.	
witold rodkiEwicz
